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NATUl<E OF TIIB CASE

This appeal is taken fran the decision of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, J. KObert Bullock, Judge, sitting with a
jury, on the 18th day of May, 1978 at Vernal, Utah.
A~pellant

thereafter obtained permission to file this appeal

bv wri.t of habeus corpus granted December 29, 19/8 bv Ernest Baldwin

judg;e of the criminal division in the Third Judicial District Court,
sittin;o: on the lau and rotion bench.

DISPOSITION

rn

FOUR1H DISTRICT COURT

Appellant was tried before the Court, sitting with a jury,
on May 18, 1978.

Following instructions, presentation of evidence and

ar",lJilleilt, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the char(;e ot manslaug_hter.

The courtaccepted the verdict and sentenced the appellant

to the indeterminate tenn of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF

somrr

ON APPEA'....

ADpellant seeks to have the decision of the Fourth Judicial
District Court reversed and the case remanded tor retrial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was arrested on March 2, 1978 and charged with nrurder
in the second degree, pursuant to UCA 76-5-203, following the death of

his 1vife, Tarrrny &:>gg,ess, frcrn a gunshot wolUld.

An information was there-

after filed likewise charp;in?; defendant with murder in the second degree.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

Detendant v..-.as assigted counsel and entered a plea of not
f,lliltv to the charge contained in the information.
Trial on the matter v!as held on May 18, 1Y73 before the
Honorable J. Hobert Bullock sittinp; with a

b

man jury.

At the outset,

tne Coi.rrt issued certain instructions to the jury concernin" the offer,;c
of second dep;ree murder and rnanslau.Q;..1-iter as defined in the Uta_li Qide.
(p

5, L. 18 to

D

6, L. 18)

DurLri?, the coi.rrse of the trial Appellant's counsel TIEt with
coi.msel for the State and with Judge Bullock privately in charlbers

and

made record of intonnation vtlich had cone to him concern111g the impro".€:
bias of one of the ji.rrors.

Cm.msel for Appellant then reserved his

ri~::

to nove for mistrial.
At the close of evidence,

t~e

coi.rrt ar,ain instructed on

murder in the second degree and manslaughter.

The jury was sequesterei

and a short time later reti.rrned with a verdict of guilty of rnanslau,o)lte:
No further action was then taken bv counsel for appellant,
nor Has an appeal filed within 30 davs, as required by la11.
Appellant was thereafter sentenced to t~e indetenninate tero
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison.
On Decffi!ber :::9, 1970 appellant's petition for Habeus Ccc

in Third Judicial District Coi.rrt was heard.

the Coi.rrt 's

Findin~s

of La'-'
were entered.
·
o f_ Fact an d Conc 1us ions
-~

This a;Jpeal 1·-.as thereupon c0!1I'El1ced.
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POl.NT I

FAILURE TU INSTRUCT THE JURY CONCEBNING

LESSER INCLLJDE0 OFFEt~~ES lS REVEkSil:\LE
J<..RROR

A Defendant m a criminal case is entitled to instructions
on all lesser included offenses vhlch are supported by any substantial

evidence.

'lhis Drincinle is fiillllv established in the l.oi:w of Utah.
A lesser included offense is one whose elemen!:s are all included

in tl-ie P;reater offense char1;ed.
v. lwlrna."._, ts4

This definition is discussed in State

Utah L3, 33 Pac. 2d. 640 (1934)

The only wav this matter may be determined is by
discovering all of the elements required by the
respective sections, canparin3 them and by a process
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those camon
and those not cor.nun, and if the greater offense includes all the legal and factual elanents, it mav
safe~ be said that the gfeater includes the lesser,
if,
vever, the lesser o fense requires the inclusion
of SCJITE necessary element or elements in order to cover
the completed offense, not so included in the [7eater
offense, then it may be safely said that the lesser is
not necessarily included in the greater
(anphasis added)
33P. Ld at 645
frnl)loying this test to the case at bar, it is clear that the
greater offense includes all the legal and factual elanents of the lesser.
TI1e offense of =der in the second decree necessarily includes all the
els™"nts of the lesser offense of ne~ligent hoori.cide.

Nep;ligent hcxnicide

is an element of the greater offense of rrn.rrder in the second decree and is

clearly a lesser included offense.
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A

test has been armounced

Dy

the Court in ?tate v. Lloyd,

568 P. 2d 357 (1977) and State v. Cornish, 568 P. 2d j6Q ll9!7)

In

t..."lese cases the Court looked to the single criminal episode statute of
the Utah Code, specifically, Section 76-1-403 (j), (l'J73) in findi.nr
that joyriding is an offer>Be included rn auto thett.

'lhis section

provides:
A defendant rnav be convicted of an offense included
in the offense- charged but mav not be convicted of
both the offense Ci1arged and the included otfense.
An offense is so included ·when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all t..."le facts reouired to establish the ccmnission
of the offense charged; or
(bJ It constitutes-an attempt, solicitation, conspiracv, or fonn of preparation to cCK'Illit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically desi~ted bv a statute as a
lesser included offense.
Applying the principals of this test to the case at bar,
it is clear that the offense of negligence hanicide is a lesser included offense of murder in ti-ie second decree.
hcrnicide falls within paragraph (a) above.

The offense of neeliqE':

It is established by proof

of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the

cOOTD-

ission of the greater offense.
ln State v. fuu.gherty, 550 P. 2d 17) (1':176) the Utah SUllrll'e
Court discussed the situations where instructions on lesser included
offenses are ref!1.1ested and when such instructions must be
matter of law.

Citing Lisby v.

~tate,

BL Nev. 183, 414 P · 2d 5gz (!Yif.

the Utah Court stated:
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'.ii~3

'lhe court discussed three situations in which the
problem of less~ lllcluded otfenses are frequently
encountered. First, where there is evidence which
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense
or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
'
Second, where the evidence would not support a find.in~
of guilt in the cornnission of· the lesser- offense or ···
degree. For example, the defendant aenies any C(J[Tlplici ty in the crime charged. and t'lUS lavs no foundation for an intermediate '1erdict ;or where the elements
of the offenses differ, and sane element essential to
the lesser offense is either not proved or sho:.J!l not to
exist. This second situation renders and instruction on
a lesser included offense erroneous, because it is nor
pertinent.
TIU.rd, is an intermediate situation. une where the elanents
of the greater offense include all the elena1ts of the
lesser offense; because, by its very nature, the greater
offense could not have been cornnitted ~ . ri.thout defendant
having the intent in doing the acts, whic.'i constitute
the lesser offense. In such a situation instructions on
the lesser included oftense may be given, because all
elements of the lesser offense have been nroved. Roi.ever,
such an instruction may properly be refused if the prosecution has met its burden of proof on the >;reater offense, and there is no evidence tendini:; to reduce the greater
offense. 111.e court concluded by stating that if that be
anv evidence, however slieht, on any reasonable theory
of the case under which the defendant might be convicted of
a lesser included offense, the court IID.ISt, if requested, give
an appropriate instruction. J50 P.2d at 176.
Since the instruction on the lesser included offense either
must have been given or was mandatory, pursuant to the authority quoted
above, it was error for the trial court not to give it.
Error in tailinES to give a jury instruction becanes prejudicial if there is a '·reasonable likelihood'' that if the reauested
instruction had been :;iven "it may have had sare effect upon the verdict
rendered"

State v. Mitcheson, 56u P. 2d 1120 (Utal-i 1'377) ·

Tnis standard

of reasonable likeli..1-ioocl 11.as been further explained in another context
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in State v. Eaten, 569 P.

2d 1114 (Utah, 1977), where the

Court stated,
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedinc<
and the protections accorded those accused of o·
crime under our law, including the presumntion of
innocence and the burden of the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt we
believe that an appeal, when there is a rea~onable
doubt as to whether the error below was prejudicial
that doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant. 569 P.2d.
This principle is also discussed in State v. Gilli1i
23 Utah 2d. 372, 463 Pac.

2d. 811 (1970) in which the defendar

counsel specifically requested an instruction on second degre:
manslaughter in the trial on an information chare;ing homicide
The court there held that the defendant is entitled to haver',
jury instructed on the lesser included offense i f there is anv
substantial evidence to justify it.

The court referred to th:

principle as being generally accepted in Utah law, citinp, to
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 Pac. 2d. 738 (1947), ~
v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 Pac. 2d. 290 (1943) and~
Ferzuson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929).
This is in accord with the law of other western
jurisdictions which hold that, particularly in cases involvin:
homicide, the Court must instruct on all lesser included off·
The
enses which are reasonably supported by the evi d ence.
I
.
of whether
holdings in these cases do not turn on the question
1
the bu:c'
have or have not requested the instruction, but P ace
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I
___........

e(

upon the court.
2d 30,

See State v. Booker, 200 kan, 166, 434 Pac.

(1968); Sanchez v. People,172 Colorado 168, 470 Pac 2d.

857 (1970); State v. Ramos 108 A 36, 492 Pac 2d 697 (1972);
State v. Ramirez, 116 A 259, 569 Pac 2d 201 (1977); State v.
Olsen, 10 R. App 90, 459 Pac 2d. 445 (1968).
The fact that the jury in this case did return a
verdict of manslaughter, having chosen

t~e

alternative lesser

offense presented to them by the court raises a reasonable
inference that the jury might have determined the defendant
guilty of negligent homicide had that offense been presented
to them for consideration.

The Appellant is entitled to have

this offense presented to the jury; it's exclusion was prejudicial
and therefore warrants reversal of his conviction in this case.
The evidence shows that a gun in the hand of the
defendant did in fact fire, injuring defendant's wife, Tammy
Boggess and that Tammy Boggess later died as a result of that
\IOUnd.

The question before the court and the jury was not
whether or not these events occured, but the state of mind of
the defendant at the time of the occurance.
Defendant was charged with criminal homicide in the

I

second debaree.

The elements of that offense are as follows:

76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.-(1)
criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor:
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(a)

Intentionally or knowin81Y caused the death oi

(b)

Intendin8 to cause serious bodily injury to

another or

another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life
that causes the death of another; or
(c)

Acting under circumstances evidencing a depravE:

indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby cac·
the death of another; or
(d)

While in the cormnission, attempted commission,

0:

immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission o'
aggravated robbery, robber, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravate
sexual assault, aggravated arson, agi:;ravated burglary, burglar:·
aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, causes the death of anot':
person other than a party.
Manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed,
is defined:
Manslaughter. - (1) Criminal homicide constitutes man·
slaughter if the actor:
(a)

Recklessly causes the death of another; or

(b)

Causes the death of another under the influence

of extreme mental disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or
.
mstances
Causes the death of another under circu
.
s orovide
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstance ·
h. conduct
a moral or legal justification or extenuation for is
or excusable
although the conduct is not legally justificable
(c)
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'.. ,1

Jer the existing circumstances.
Negligent homicide - (1) Criminal homicide
constitutes negligent homicide if the actor,
acting with criminal negli"ence causes the
death of another.
0

'

The elements of these offense are substantially the
same except in the expression of the state of mind of the offender.
Reference to the definitions of the terms referring to state of
mind of UCA 76-2-103 shows that criminal negligence differs from
"recklessness." and both differ from "knowingly" only in degree.
The Utah Code defines "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent"
76-2-103 A person engages in conduct:

(1) Intentionally, or with intent to willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to
his conduct or to circumstances su~rounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct
or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result
of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or th~ result
of his conduct when he is aware of but continusously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances is viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally .
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
th~ circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
The facts presented to the jury in this case substantial.
support the elements, not only of the offenses of second degree
homicide and manslaughter, but nelgigent homicide as well. Ev·
idence of Appellant's intention at the time of the shooting was
introduced by the victim's statements denying malicious intent
(P 62 LS to L 14); Appellant's testimony (P 55, L 2 to P 57, L

30 P 94 L 10 to line 26, P 97 L 24 to L 29 P 101, L 29

toP101~

L 14) indicates activities and a State of mind which a reasonab!:
jury could have characterized as criminal negligence, as defineo
by Utah law.
Accordingly, it was error for the Court, with or
without the request of counsel, to omit an instruction on neg·
ligent homicide.

This omission was prejudicial to appellant

in that it deprived a jury which was not convinced that appellan:
killed intentionally and knowingly,

that being the element of

second degree murder which differs from by exceeding the element;!
of manslaughter.

"Criminal negligence" does not significantly

differ from "recklessly" as used in the definition of the offensi
of manslaughter.
.
int
Appellant urges reversal and remand on t h is po
·

II THE COURT'S FAILURE TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR
During the course of the trial, counsel for
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appellant became apprised of the bias of one of the jurors.
He notified the Court of his findings during a meeting with
opposing counsel in the judge's chambers, but did not then or
later request a mistrial.
cu~bent

Defendant asserts that it was in-

upon the court to declare a mistrial, based upon the

information concerning this juror.
The State of Utah law on this point is established by
two early cases:
In State v. Mickle,25 Utah 719, 70 Pac. 2d. 857 (1902)
a juror previous to trial made a statement to the effect "I think
the defendants are guilty and they ought to be convicted anyway on gene;ral principles".

This court in that case held that

the previously expressed bias of a juror which was not admitted
durin~

voire dire required reversal of the defendant's conviction

for grand larceny and remand for ,a new trial.
In State v. Morgan, 23, Ut. 212, 64 Pac. 2d. 356 (1901)
this court reversed a homicide conviction based upon the prejudgment of one juror which was with-held during voire dire
and further stated that in a homicide case, where the verdict
must be unanimous, the misconduct of one juror constitutes misconduct of the entire jury, requiring that the defendant be
given the benefit of an impartial jury and new trial·
In the case at bar, as in the cases cited above, one
of the jurors, Mr. Robert Wingar expressed a strong negative
bias toward the defendant prior to trial and then withheld his
opinion during the vior dire.

This information was made avail-

able to the Court by counsel for defendant·

(p 110 L 13 to p

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

113L23).
Defendant asserts that it was the affirmative duty
of the Court to make further inquiry into this matter and to
declare a mistrial in this case.

Failure to do so should be

deemed a reversible error.
III APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION, OF COUNSEL
AS REQUIRED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTIOH OF
THE UNITED STATES
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitutio:.
provides that each defendant shall have the right to the ass·
istancEo of counsel in his defense.

The Supreme Court and this

court have interpreted this phrase to mean the assistance of
effective counsel.

Anderson v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d. 182, 493

P20. 2d. 1278 (1972).
In this case the defendant was denied effective re·
presentation by two grevious errors on the part of his counsel
The first error is failure to require or otherwise
i

discuss and acquaint the jury with the lesser included offense·
of negligent homicide ... indeed, counsel requested of the ju0
that they bring in a verdict for the one lesser included off·

i

ense of manslaughter, while entirely neglecting the possibilit:'
of negligent homicide throughout the proceedings.
Secondly, and perhaps most troublesome,

is counsel's

lly aware
failure to move for mistrial, even throug h h e was fu
. t to the
of the defect in the jury, having himself broug h t 1

attention of the Court.
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b

Courts have avoided holding that counsel was ineffective,
but in case discussing the issue have spoken as follows:

In

State v. Delaney, 351 Pac. 2d. 85, 221 Or. 620 (1960) on appeal
from conviction for assualt with intent to conunit rape, the court
stated that a new trial would be granted if the record reflects
a prejudicial lack of attention and diligence on the part of such
counsel.

Similarly, in State v. Keller, 400 Pac. 2d. 370, 65

Was, 2d. 907, the court, while affirming the conviction, stated
the principle that a new trial must be granted when incompetence
or neglect of appointed counsel results in violation of constitutional
rights by reducing trial to a farce.
While defendant does not assert that his trial in this
case was a farce, counsel's failure to note the lessor included
offense and especially to act on information concerning impropriety in the jury robbed appellant of effective representation
and the right to a fair and impartial trial.
The duty of counsel in a criminal matter, and more
particularly in a conviction for homicide, extends to perfection
of an ap~eal, should that be the desire of the defendant.

In this

case, even though counsel for appellant was well aware of at
least one ground for reversal, he failed to perfect an appeal or
to contact the appellant concerning this matter after his conviction.
Counsel failure to file a timely appeal denies appellant of his opportunity to correct the errors existing at his
cri.al

This denial of due process has been dealt with by the

Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed.
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2d. 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), holding that the constitutio na,

1

right

to counsel requires that on an indigent defendant's fir;

appeal from his conviction, court appointed counsel must supp·
ort the appeal to the best of his ability, and may withdraw
only after filing briefs on behalf of the appellant and ther,
only if the court agrees that the appeal is wholly frivolous.
Counsel's failure to perfect an appeal in this case is submittf
as further evidence of lack of interest and diligence in this
case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant urges this court to reverse his conviction
for manslaughter based upon one or more of the errors describe:
herein.
Appellant was severaly prejudiced by the trial coun'
failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of negligen:
homicide.

The elements of negligent homicide were substantial:·

supported by the evidence adduced.

Substantial case law supp·

orts the proposition that this error requires remand (~
Dougherty, supra, State v. Mitcheson, supra, State v. Gil~·
supra
Further

Appellant was denied a fair trial in this

case by the impropriety of one juror, which must be imputed to
all of the jurors (State v. Morgan, supra)

and by the failure

t · cularlv
·
of his counsel to remedy or act on these errors. par 1
f 11 juror
was much as counsel recoganized the impropriety o t e
ten Iv
sitting in appellants case; counsel failed to act compe
·

in Appellants behalf as required by ethical cannons
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6

!:<-1---

•

Appellant submits that each of the errors is sufficient to require reversal; that the combination of errors
renders them more potent, and the effect on the outcome of
Appellant's case more prejudicial.

Respectfully Submitted

David Paul White
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